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OTHER JOUISSANCE \*

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Freud ties men and women to the same stake, that of phallic pleasure, to explain the nature and limits of their sexual encounters. However, we know the slap with which Dora, a pioneer of feminism, responded to the supposed mastery of such a guardian: "servant," she said, taking a step back.

Because he refers these pastoral interpretations to the very unnatural and rather poorly constructed constraints by which the signifying order engenders the speaking being, Lacan can distinguish, in addition to phallic jouissance, a supplementary jouissance: *Other*, specific to those who have opted for the feminine position.

And this innovation is of considerable interest for at least three reasons. First, there is the methodological reason: it is the reference to structure and the evaluation of its logical consequences that illuminates an entire area of clinical practice that would otherwise remain a blind spot.

Next, we question the limits of phenomenology: this clinic collects behaviors which, although obvious, suffer from the paradox of not being able to be expressed by those who experience them, while their conceptualization by those who hear them condemns them to being misunderstood, that is, evaluated according to the parameters of the Master's discourse. Female sexuality thus ranges from those who cannot express it to those who cannot hear it. Finally, of clinical interest: the perfectly specific organization of this jouissance accounts for a whole series of facts otherwise placed in the "pre-genital" basket, that is, conceived as accidents and interruptions in development; it seems that the belief that "it will grow one day" is not the prerogative of little Hans.

What makes this enjoyment of the Other so unique? Let us answer succinctly with a distinguishing feature: it is not based on the support provided by a limit to the grasping of an object that is now guaranteed to be other, heterosexual. Without the support of a limit, deprived of the stable resistance of the object, it delivers the person who is addicted to it to a repetition of blows that must now increase in intensity and accelerate in rhythm in order to try to reach the heaven of an Other: a moment briefly achieved with sleep or coma, which is only accomplished as a successful act, that is, founded for eternity, with death. Only the biological body, in fact, offers a natural resistance that such a process can only seek to force.

Being thus unfounded in law, this enjoyment is not prohibited either, that is to say, it can be articulated; it operates without the person who supports it being able to claim it, to ever have it recognized by another, to uphold its image other than through the actual presence of an object destined to be consumed: oscillation between elation and depression.

This impossible knowledge fuels an intense and demanding quest for recognition that is no less desperate. Of course, a founding object, an eponymous ancestor, can be imagined: the *breast*.

For example, which will fuel the dream of fluid mechanics in some people; an all-powerful mother who, by responding to all needs, would abolish the complications and torments of desire: that there is no sexual relationship. The disadvantage here, however, is that success signals failure, since a perfect donation of the object would at the same time eliminate any conflict, whether it could be described as good or bad. Thus, it is the mere presence of the object that guarantees the existence of another, access to which is now proposed as the end of a chain that is no longer metonymic but made up of links of progressively increasing weight.

Sexual satisfaction itself, and even the question of choosing a sexual partner, are overshadowed here by processes of incorporation, oral for example, and aspirations for fusion. We know how Freud gave up cocaine for Martha; but the fact that a woman demands to be the only one, the exclusive one, and the real one for her man, the one whose absence would plunge him into a state of deprivation, illustrates the sought-after prevalence of this Other enjoyment, the fulfillment of which is certainly narcissistic but no longer involves sex as anything more than one of many other medals. By not being heterosexual, the object here offers a level playing field that allows for perfect reversibility with the partner, supports the image of a fusion with him that is successful enough for him to become an essential part of one's own body (which the child registers as an inevitably captivating and devouring mother), and arouses the very ordinary desire (in the good mother or perfect wife) for murder, which would complete this enjoyment while at the same time being a liberating act. We can see the paranoid style characteristic of this process.

The subject's place is preserved only by this precarious in-between: the presence of the object, whose exhilarating nature depends solely on the announcement of its disappearance, torn apart by a love that would like to be eternal when what arouses it is the proximity of its consumption. Once this is accomplished, it is worth the ordeal of depersonalization, the experience of death that would be authentic if it were not for the unrestrained, unguarded, and shameless imperative of the signifier, which drives the now irresponsible creature into a frantic quest for reunion, for a new cycle, but one that is each time abbreviated. It is easy to admit that this Other enjoyment implements another logic: the impossibility of using the concept, the rejection of any bivalence, sympathy for the skepticism of intuitionism, an overt taste for "openness," denunciation of the ridiculousness of all dogmatism, etc. We can decipher what prompts the attempt to produce what would be specifically feminine speech, in other words, to lift your daughter's silence for good. The difficulty is that this speech, if what is written here is true, could not be valid for the speech uttered on the other side, the male side, thereby abolishing the specificity claimed. The fact that this enjoyment of the Other cannot be authorized by any universal only further encourages the attempt to force the impasse through the expression of a collective manifestation. There is no need for a feminist gathering for this. It is clear that its mass

manifestation has been taking place for a long time, thanks to men who champion this feminist cause, which should not be devalued by identifying it, actively, in *bacchanalian* enjoyment.

It would be interesting to undertake an ethnographic journey to verify how, in various groups, phallic enjoyment is doubled, even in primitive societies, by another form of enjoyment, which complicates the system of filiation. In our country, experience shows that a maternal deity is celebrated on a massive scale, without any explicit myth to justify it, and public opinion therefore swings between complicit tolerance and repudiation for excess. This myth only takes shape, vengefully, when the use of "foreign" or chemical drugs breaks the bond of affiliation and isolates the deviant followers who suddenly become guilty and sick, incomprehensible in any case.

Finally, it should be noted that this vital dependence on an object whose consumption can only increase, as achieved by Other enjoyment, is the very ideal sought by industrial society. As such, it is foreseeable that the ethics inherent in this type of enjoyment will benefit from increased promotion, as they say. This will keep us moving, but in a different way: that is, running.

#### COMMENTARY ON OTHER ENJOYMENT \*

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Question: We would like you to explain in more detail the Lacanian concept of Other Jouissance as you present it in your article.

Charles Melman: For this article, I started with what seemed to me to be a clinical obviousness. We are dealing with a number of pathological cases where what is evident is a type of enjoyment whose modalities escape us. I mean that we are a little too quick to classify it as perversion. What prompted me to write this article was, on the one hand, obviously the existence and encounter with alcoholism, and on the other hand, the encounter with drug addicts; also, the fact that with regard to this mode of jouissance, this pathology, we remain powerless in our methods and conceptualizations.

From this point on, insofar as alcoholism is a phenomenon that seems more social than individual, we may wonder what a symptom is that takes on this aspect, which cannot simply be described as collective. Hysteria is also widespread. But alcoholics and drug addicts, I believe, enjoy themselves among themselves, which is not the case with hysteria. I mean that an alcoholic needs to enjoy himself with another alcoholic; it is a shared enjoyment. There are solitary drug addicts, but we know that there is a need for a companion, someone to participate. That is why it seemed to me that alongside this phallic enjoyment, governed by our castration, I mean a mode of enjoyment around which we are socially united, there was another.

What is the discourse of the master? It is nothing other than the affirmation of phallic jouissance. This is not obvious in Lacan's texts, but that is how it is. That is why, when we attack the master, we must take into account all the dimensions that we are questioning.

It therefore seemed to me that, in reality, this phallic jouissance was itself socially doubled by another, not symbolized as such; since to symbolize it would be to place it under the heading of phallic jouissance. This Other jouissance had this paradox, this privilege, I cannot say of existing — for that is the whole difficulty, since if it existed, it would be grounded — but to function, and yet to be neither spoken nor heard; that is what I discuss in my paper. Our embarrassment as doctors faced with these cases was that we were confronted with something that we could only approach in terms, I would say, of the master's discourse; for that is how we as doctors approach pathology; all hysterical pathology has never been approached in any other way. In addition to the complicity that binds the hysterical person to the master, the master is only too willing to respond to it. We therefore found ourselves faced with these manifestations like a fish faced with an apple: we have no idea what to do with them or what to say about them. Finally, what we usually say about it is rather foolish. What we say about alcoholism and drug addiction is generally ineffective. Moreover, the patient immediately throws this back in our faces; they do not hesitate to let us know that what we have to say to them, they have already heard, that they do not need us to invent it, and that we are therefore faced with something quite admirable that works among

We, who circulate, who are there and whom we cannot express or hear. This is why I felt it was possible to draw a parallel with what Lacan was able to do—and what Freud was not—thanks to the properties of structure, by isolating, with regard to women, the possibility of an Other jouissance, that is to say, specifically feminine jouissance. I was struck by the fact that what, in my view, characterized the process of this Other jouissance in women could be entirely consistent with the clinical picture we see in alcoholism and drug addiction.

So I wondered about these cases: what if we weren't dealing with structural phenomena and what if we had to start by recognizing the social existence of this other form of enjoyment? That's what drug addicts tell us: "We don't give a damn about you and your stories; we have the right to do as we please." They seem like aliens to us.

How is this mode of jouissance consistent with what Lacan recognizes as Other jouissance in women?

What characterizes this Other enjoyment? It is supported by a set that is unbounded, meaning that it is not constructed on a limit. A bounded set is a set that functions within limits; that is, you can approach these limits: they are either included or excluded: either they belong to the set or they are outside it. If they are included, the signifier can grasp its limits. If they are excluded, you can approach them as closely as you want, but you will never reach the limit itself; this is the problem with real numbers. And then there are sets that are not bounded, capable of extending to infinity, with no term constituting the boundary. Phallic jouissance is a jouissance whose

property is to be sustained by a set that is bounded, and this bound is constituted by the phallus, something that, unless you are perverse, you are forbidden to attain. There is something called the castration complex. Here, we must draw an analogy between the process of repression and the fact that you are dealing with a closed and bounded set; you cannot reach this boundary. It is this boundary that forms the basis of enjoyment in this set: you operate on the basis that all the elements in this set refer to this boundary. That is the meaning of the phallus. All the signifiers you ultimately have to deal with: phallicism, the pansexualism for which Freud was criticized, that is it. The pansexualism that Freud found in dreams means that all elements have a sexual meaning. And why limit it to dreams? What we can say in the name of reason, consciousness, and good feelings, we know as analysts that all of this revolves around fantasy, that it is a sexual construction that ultimately speaks of sex. Lacan goes one step further by saying that sex, that is, what makes sense, is supported by absence, by *nonsense*. This further step is essential, it is fundamental, particularly in the case of hysteria. Indeed, Freud systematically failed in his treatment of hysterics, we must not forget that. His merit is that all the cases of analysis he gave us are cases of failed analysis. It was very chic of him: he did not recount his triumphs. Even the story of the Rat Man's death at the front is not... As for the story of Little Hans, it is not an analysis, it is indirect, but ultimately we can assume that it was not successful. The Wolf Man, we know that... well, it kept him alive!

So it is a system of signifiers such that we, as neurotics, are completely at ease because our world is vectorized. From the moment we pass through the signifier, we know that we are guided, led, and even allow ourselves to be led. It is this principle that makes us particularly domesticated animals; we have nothing to worry about, the signifier will lead us to a *jouissance* that is there, waiting for us. Let us try to imagine what would happen in a system where this kind of vectorization no longer works, where phallic meaning is lacking and where, nevertheless, because of the signifier, there is castration. I mean that from the moment we are dealing with the signifier, there is no longer any direct meaning between a name and an object. So because of the play of the signifier, there is castration, but this castration supported by an object no longer has any reason to exist in the Other. Why would this object be forbidden? The forbidden (we know the play on words, Lacan's distinction between the forbidden [*interdit*] and the inter-said [*interdit*]), it is quite clear that for drug addicts and alcoholics, the object of their addiction is not forbidden or inter-said. We cannot say that the signifiers speak of it. Two alcoholics do not meet to make puns about it... things are implied. They meet over a drink and then they exchange it between themselves, that's it! I'll buy the drinks and then you will; I have it, I'll give it to you; you have it, you give it to me. The object does not function at all as a reference to the phallus in what would be this place, this position where it would come to establish some kind of significance. Nevertheless, this object exists without being repressed; it exists at the end of the chain, in an exclusively metonymic position, like the object of desire in phallic *jouissance*. But as I was trying to make clear, it is not supported by anything that is of the order of metaphor. It is nevertheless an interesting and important point that leads us to say that alcoholism has no father. It seeks a father because it always feels terribly alone. I mean that in this position where there is

no father, there is no counterpart in the imaginary. It seeks a counterpart in order to see itself. It is not out of love for the counterpart, but in order to be able to identify its own face, since it does not have it in the Other. And you will notice how alcoholics do not see themselves. They come to us with bruises, cuts, rosacea, etc., and then say, "me, drink?" What does this kind of radical indifference on the part of alcoholics to their image mean? It means that for them, there is no gaze in the Other. In order to see oneself, one must always assume that the Other is looking at one, and for the alcoholic, this gaze from the Other does not exist, which leads to a kind of paradox. I will try to reconstruct with you the path that I have taken. What happens when we are dealing with a meaningful organization where there is no longer the support provided by this unattainable, that is to say, repressed, forbidden boundary? There is obviously a fundamental question in this register: is there a fantasy? (Because for there to be an object, there must be a fantasy).

Question: You said, "Alcoholism has no father," not the alcoholic, but alcoholism.

C.M.: Yes, alcoholism. But yes, he doesn't have it. On the other hand, we can say that he has a mother, which is quite annoying. But the fantasy exists because this object has a certain periodicity. It appears and disappears at a rhythm that becomes exclusively biological. This is what Freud identified very clearly as the pleasure principle, that is, this kind of concern with bringing the level back to the lowest tension.

Lacan says somewhere, it must be in "Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic of Desire," that the law of pleasure regulation, the law introduced by the signifier regarding the regulation of desire, precedes a natural law, a quasi-biological law, which is that the organism protects itself, defends itself against the rise of tension, against the rise of desire. The organism wants peace, and what we see, I believe, in these cases—in alcoholics and drug addicts—is biological regulation. But there is an additional problem that is very interesting for us, which is that this biological regulation—not based on a law that would be that of the signifier, but rather on the phenomenon known as addiction, properties specific to the organism—is always pushed further and further back. This is why alcoholics and drug addicts have this problem of ever-increasing doses, that is to say, the organism has this property of becoming accustomed and requires ever-increasing quantities to reproduce the phenomenon. In other words, there is a fantasy, in the sense that this object appears and disappears, it is there and it is not there. But, as we know, for alcoholics and drug addicts, the problem is to ensure that the object is present even when it has disappeared, which is complicated for them. The alcoholic needs to have bottles under his bed, or he needs to know that the bar or grocery store is still open; the drug addict needs to know that his dealer can be found at a certain place or that he has a stash in the closet. And we know that if this does not happen, i.e., if the object has disappeared when they do not need it, they don't need the object to consume it, they need the object to have proof of its presence, insofar as the signifying chain they are dealing with does not refer to it, that it is not this object that gives meaning to the chain, we therefore know that if the object (in the case of an alcoholic or drug addict) disappears, it triggers an anxiety attack that can turn into delirium.

The worst thing for an alcoholic is to no longer have that thing at hand. That doesn't mean he needs it; you could even say that he consumes it in an attempt to incorporate that object so that it will remain, so that it will finally be hooked for good, so that he will have it in his skin, in his body.

Why is it the body? If it is precisely this chain of signifiers, it needs to cling to the body: an impossible task, no matter how much he takes; he cannot get it to cling to the body except in one way, which is to bring the matter to a definitive end, that is, by overdose. That is why the usual path is overdose, with the kind of certainty commanded by the signifying chain that if it can introduce death (but actual death, the deadly dimension), it feels that, at last, it will be attached for good. If he can introduce a deadly dimension into this chain, as it exists in phallic signification, from that moment on, he will be, so to speak, registered.

What seemed clear to me, then, was that by using what Lacan introduced about this Other jouissance—well, it is I who am using the term "Other jouissance," that is, jouissance regulated differently, regulated by the Other, we will be able to account for the clinical problems we encounter, which otherwise remain enigmatic, in a way that was previously unprecedented. There is a new clinical approach to be developed concerning alcoholics and drug addicts, along with the problem we have to deal with regarding transference. Is transference possible in these cases? And this other problem: what could be a cure for this situation?

On the question of transference, I can refer to my experience with a few alcoholics and also with a drug addict. (I don't have many drug addicts because, as you know, they don't come: they know that what we have to say to them isn't worth a damn; they really take us for records or loudspeakers of a discourse that they perceive very well as coming from elsewhere, that we are puppets; they consider our enjoyment to be that of simpletons, petty bourgeois, conventional people). The miracle, if I may say so, is that with alcoholics, there is a transference. Undoubtedly, the alcoholic is specific to transference. This transference is somewhat unusual, since we will take on the characteristics of the object for him. This simply means that if he cannot reach us during the weekend or holidays, not only does he drink, but this can also trigger considerable anxiety attacks and episodes of delirium. I saw how an intelligent and very likeable alcoholic I was treating began to break down shortly before the holidays and then, eight days after I left on vacation, was admitted to a psychiatric hospital: he was delirious without having drunk particularly heavily. And why was he delirious? This is also of interest to us, if you like, in terms of the genesis of delirium. He was delirious because his fantasy no longer held, because the object was no longer there, given the distance imposed by metric space or time. There was no longer any reference point provided by the object. I had given him my address, but it was no use. From then on, he was dealing with a chain whose elements began to scatter in all directions, in all senses, and you no longer know what to say.

On the other hand, he tries to establish a relationship with the therapist that is intended to be an attempt to establish the camaraderie of the alcoholic. I must say that the one I am thinking of

succeeded with his first analyst, who was a very kind, very capable person who would have lunch with him, etc. He succeeded. This shows how urgent it is for him to establish this kind of symmetry and transitivity. This kind of appeal, which aims at mutual incorporation, this kind of familiarity (what we call the familiarity of the alcoholic, that is, the abolition of all distance with this mutual baring: "we have nothing to hide from each other, there are no secrets between us") thus refers to a rather telling and eloquent mode of transference, posing the problem, which for me is no more resolved than it is for the patient, of its resolution.

I have a case that I followed at the hospital, of a brave man, very intelligent, a heavy drinker, living with a woman who was the same age as his mother, who knew perfectly well that it was an incestuous relationship and made no secret of it, and who left me in a very proper manner; but I have not heard from him since. He came to see me a few weeks ago, and since I was late, he didn't wait. I don't know what to think about it. Maybe it's good, maybe not. Anyway, I'd be interested to know what became of him. I'm a little hesitant to write to him because I don't want to upset him...

With this man, whom I mentioned earlier, whom I continue to see and who has delirious, hallucinatory dreams during periods of withdrawal, the following happened: he wasn't doing too badly and in his little village (he lives near Paris; he is a health insurance teacher), he was appointed (very curiously) president of a small group that provides aid to Poland. He was very happy and proud. He gave a beautiful speech. And then, in the days that followed, he started drinking again. When he arrived at my place, at the hospital, I stopped him a little. It is likely that there was something intolerable for him in this promotion, in what took him out of his field and put him in a position where he lost his previous references, and he was immediately forced to start drinking again.

I also saw a serious drug addict, who still is, by the way. It was very interesting. He is the son of a magistrate, a very intelligent and capable boy, who is completely lost. He taught himself music. He became a music teacher entirely through self-study. The first thing to note is that when he came to see me, I was the first analyst he had ever seen. His relationship with me was very interesting because he needed to maintain a certain distance: he was very afraid of transference. He didn't come to his appointments, but he needed to know that I was there. He would call me; he would check that I was there, to apologize, to make up an excuse. And he needed to know that I still loved him, that is, that I didn't hold it against him and that I would see him another time. He didn't necessarily come, but I was there. He needed to realize what I was talking about earlier when I mentioned structure: to manage to maintain my presence without being, so to speak, devoured, entirely consumed by that presence. I respected that completely every time; I never made any demands; I accepted being mistreated by him. I was there, he was on the phone, he was checking, he was apologizing. He also needed—and I found this interesting—me to accept his deception, that is, he came to my house saying he wasn't using drugs anymore when it was obvious he was still using; I was in no way seeking to obtain what would have been an admission of the kind: "don't take me for a fool." He needed to establish a system with me in which the



Other would have made possible the dimension of truth in deception, which is our relationship to the Other. Lacan, I find, has admirably noted this. It is thanks to him, moreover, that we can say such things. For truth can only be half-told [*mi-dire*], and truth is sustained only by deception; it is through the deception of the Other that the dimension of truth is founded; that there is in the Other both this dimension of recognition and also of deception, and that I recognize him as a subject only insofar as, through the signifier, he is capable of deceiving me. It is in this that the signifier differs from the sign.

You all know what Lacan says about this: that a subject is someone who can lead me astray. You know the story of the Jewish anecdote... He needed to engage in a game with me that aimed to establish this dimension, which we can see is impossible in drug addicts and alcoholics. I mean from a structural point of view. In a chain that is exclusively metonymic, there is no possibility of deception. Each element speaks openly about the object that is there at the end, but without deception, since each of these elements leads irreducibly, is pointed, vectorized toward this object. Not respecting the dimension of deception in alcoholics and drug addicts does not seem entirely fair to me. The only problem is that recognizing it in ourselves is not progress; it is still artificial, it is still, if I may say so, orthopedic. Moreover, we can obtain a confession from the alcoholic or drug addict, but this does not lead to any work being done; we have gained nothing once the person has confessed the fact; it cannot be an act.

Question: Are we dealing with this type of pathology without meaning?

C. M.: We are not outside the signifier but within a signifier that is no longer governed by signification; I would even say that we are within the pure signifier, something that in myth is represented by chaos. The signifier governed by signification is marked by pure difference, non-identity, but also by the fact that there is the isolation of a signifier which, as such, is repressed. At least one is missing, at least one signifier that is repressed and which, I would say through the intervention of the father, takes on phallic significance.

Question: But can we give this signifier the status of signifier?

C. M.: There are elements that remain differential and are valuable precisely because of their opposition.

Question: Another signifier? So there is no longer this relationship between the signifier that represents the subject for a signifier?

C. M.: That's the question I was trying to raise about fantasy. What happens to fantasy in an organization like that? So, if you like, it's the material lack of the object that creates the subject, but a subject that is exposed to this kind of alternative: either it exists as a subject because the object is lacking, but then it is the pain of existing in its most atrocious form, it exists, but it is truly the pain and anguish of living, that is to say, "What do we want?" Or it has this object, but then it abolishes itself before it as a subject, it is no longer anything. In the alcoholic, for example, there is nothing but drunkenness, that is to say, the chain that somehow speaks for

itself. It is the manic aspect of drunkenness in which the machine speaks for itself and he is only the vocalizer, if I may say so, he is only the apparatus, the madness of a chain that rattles.

Question: Could you clarify what does happen, beyond the paternal contributions, so to speak? Can we say that the Name-of-the-Father emerged but had no effect?

C. M.: Is this a foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father or is it a process of denial? We can say that there is no foreclosure. Anyone can become a drug addict.

Question: Do you believe that?

C. M.: Absolutely.

Question: It's not obvious because, in families of alcoholics, there are people who could very well be alcoholics but aren't, even though they have every opportunity to be. That's why I don't believe it.

C. M.: I will try to justify my point. We must not forget that functioning based on castration also involves the process of repression, which has a number of consequences and causes a certain unease. Functioning based on the Name-of-the-Father is something consists of consenting to what is akin to a sacrifice. In other words, we accept this unease as a good thing. Things start to go wrong when there is a shift in ideas, ethical changes that come to say that unease is not a good thing.

You know, it's purely an ethical issue. This story can be dated; it began in the 18th century. Lacan quotes Saint-Just on this subject: "happiness, this new idea in Europe, has become a factor in politics." The idea of happiness is not self-evident; one could even elaborate on this and say that it is an idea with unfortunate consequences. From the moment you start to demand it and even, as Lacan does, to take "le bonheur" etymologically, you are embarking on a strange endeavor. What I mean by this is that, even if it is accidental—it is well known that there are accidental alcoholics and drug addicts—you have access to what you perceive very clearly as another mode of jouissance, where precisely this type of renunciation implied by phallic jouissance is lifted.

There is a highly honorable and respectable segment of the elite that functions by refusing to submit to the constraints implied by phallic enjoyment. I had the opportunity to meet a remarkable, well-known poet who lived to be over 80 years old, working brilliantly and being a heavy drinker. What I mean, still on the subject of the Name-of-the-Father, is that it seems that this is a transition that is not impossible, even if only accidentally.

Question: Is it always possible to switch from one kind of enjoyment to another?

C. M.: Exactly: I was wondering if this poet's talent wasn't linked to the possibility of this game, and his poetry is precisely constructed on a kind of disarticulation of the signifier, which sometimes highlights it in its greatest metaphorical balance, and sometimes brings it back to a kind of pure materiality.

Question: For this permutation to be possible, does it need to be supported by something, to be based on something that has a certain stability in order to make the permutation possible?

C. M.: It seems that what makes this shift possible is the idea of progress, that it is possible to transcend this enjoyment, which I would call "unhappy," and the idea that progress is possible, that there is a way to go further. When Aragon writes "Woman is the future of man," it is clear that this is sustained by the perception that there is another kind of enjoyment that would make it possible to resolve the constraints and difficulties of phallic enjoyment. What we are doing is more of an attempt to reflect collectively on this article, to identify a number of problems and to report on clinical facts. After all, it must be said that this stems from practical problems. I was an assistant in the admissions department at Sainte-Anne; every morning, I had to write about thirty certificates for patients that the Special Infirmary had "picked up" during the day. The next day they would arrive at my home and I would have to write the certificate for their admission or non-admission. For me, it was a very rich test, with all the requirements of a certain legal rigor, and it was this that made me realize that we were dealing with things that could not be considered accidental, I mean of the same order as neurosis. These were things that had an organization, a structure, much broader, much more decisive, restrictive, and when Lacan brought up this question of the enjoyment of the Other with his formulas on sexualization, I must say that before, I couldn't quite grasp it. It seems that this leads to a revision, a clarification of our clinical practice and also to a revision of our therapeutic attitude. For example, it is obvious that the problem of detoxification must be measured on the basis of this: one of two things, either you are dealing with accidental drug addiction, as was the case with Cocteau, who developed an artistic drug addiction; he wanted to taste other paradises, but after a while, he got stuck; all it took was for him to undergo treatment, as he recounted in his book *Opium* (1), which incidentally contains some beautiful drawings, to get back on his feet. But if you take a real drug addict, who is not accidental, or a real alcoholic, and you make them undergo detoxification treatment, it is clear that you are making them worse because you are making them dependent on something even more ferocious; this thing causes increased tension and can trigger a depressive episode. So you see, we can review and think about other methods of treatment. I find that the only way to treat an alcoholic, and this is a point that is only briefly touched on in this article, is to give them a guarantee, an assurance on the side of their narcissism. In other words, to ensure that they are no longer in a state of dependence as they were before, since now this object, even if only imaginary, could be incorporated by them thanks to a kind of possible exaltation of their narcissism: by giving him, in a way, a constructed image of himself, albeit artificially, an image that is stable and guaranteed, and which makes him know that thanks to the image that is now his, there is an object that stands and remains.

(1) J. Cocteau, *Opium, journal d'une désintoxication*, 1930, republished in 1983 by Stock.

Question: Is this about giving back to religion?

C. M.: We are not on the side of religion because it is an imaginary dimension that does not appeal to the great Other; it only needs one community of brothers, which means that it is always the gaze of the little ones that enhances its value. I would say it is orthopedic.

Question: Is there a patriarch in a community?

C. M.: No, it is not organized around a patriarch, it is organized around a fraternal community.

Question: A hierarchy?

C.M.: Not even. In France, Alcoholics Anonymous operates intelligently on this principle; you realize that it's the same thing, it's always there, it's an object that speaks, if you have a relapse, you are recovered, revalued, and you talk about it. If you like, it's a bar without alcohol, it's not religion or church at all.

Question: Does this work based on the alcoholic's confession, even though it was once said that the alcoholic's confession was useless?

C. M.: That is to say, we love you despite that. Even though the thing that could make you feel valued and loved is lacking, we still love you.

Question: Do people love you because of that?

C. M.: And we love you for that, very true!

Question: I would like to come back to what you said earlier, that he has no father, but what is annoying is that he has a mother. Is there a structural relationship insofar as you are suggesting that there is a structure in relation to maternal desire?

C. M.: We seem to take this for granted. As an analyst, what do we mean by mother, a good mother, the right breast, etc.? What does the relationship between a mother and her child mean? I think there are many ways to talk about it, but there seems to be one possible way for this circumstance, which is that the mother's message to her child would be: "you must give me this object, you must give it up." But this revolves around an exchange, that is to say: "you give it to me and I will give you something else." And it seems to me that the breast is inseparable from the economy of this first exchange; if the breast takes on value as a detachable object, it is because of this first economy.

There is already something reciprocal between the mother and her child; there is something more in the mother's words, which is: "I'm giving it to you," but ultimately it is not entirely lost, that is to say, "I, as a mother, and if I am a mother, am telling you that you will be able to find it again one day." It is an exchange, but it is not fundamentally lost. It seems to me that we can talk about the mother, about what makes a mother special, in terms like these, and we could even add something more: that the mother's reference to the Name-of-the-Father is something like: "You see, if it were up to me," the mother says to her child, "you would have it. But I myself am submissive, I can't do otherwise." And I believe that what we call a mother's gentleness is of this

kind. That is why it does not seem excessive to me to mention how much the alcoholic treats his wife like a mother and is jealous of his children; he is jealous of his children because he feels that she gives them this object and that he is deprived of this object because of his children.

Question: But what entitles the mother, in a structure where a man could take the same maternal position?

C. M.: But a man, I would say in the couple, in the triangle, cannot do this because in reality he deprives the child of his mother. Unless he himself takes on a maternal role and a kind of incestuous invitation, there is a kind of denial between what he is capable of saying and the reality that is inscribed in the facts, in the real world. He deprives the child of his mother: she is not entirely his.

Question: But doesn't a mother who takes the position of "if it were up to me" reinforce the suppression of desire?

C. M.: Yes, it reinforces it. It seems that this is what is so poignant about the relationship between a child and his mother. Especially the relationship between a boy and his mother; the relationship between a girl and her mother is obviously more complicated, more conflictual, and more painful. I must say that when we talk about the relationship with the mother, we always tend to imagine the boy's relationship with the mother—the relationship with the girl is more painful; but what is pathetic about a mother's relationship with her son is that the mother always seems to say to her son, "If it were up to me." At the same time, it is quite obvious that in this "if it were up to me," she introduces a third party. This introduces the most common form of humiliation, which is the ordinary fate; also insofar as she defends her position as a mother and her position as a woman; as if, from then on, he were doomed to separate them.

Question: You didn't mention perverts, who are always talking about sex. I don't know if you can relate that to Other enjoyment?

C. M.: I believe that perverts are constructed in a completely different way. They are constructed on the basis of phallic pleasure. This shows us that we cannot necessarily say that alcoholics or drug addicts are perverts.