

i. Foreword

Freedom is a strange thing because, for most of us, it appears to be something we lack and need to regain ownership of. In the best case scenario, it is a *usufruct*—*usus* and *fructus*—that is disconnected from its bare owner; a *usus* and *fructus* that our lives would rather testify to, as we behave like bare owners, while the *usus* and *fructus* belong to someone else. Freedom, therefore, not only would be lacking, but would itself be fundamentally flawed. We forget that, just like truth, its unsatisfactory, incomplete nature is less due to a hypothetical flaw than to its structure, since this depends on the signifier of a lack in the Other, a padding that, moreover, does not respond. Lacan wrote this as S (A). When, due to clinical circumstances, we find ourselves both naked owners and *usufructuaries*, the said freedom proves to be null and void: without any point of application, due to the ejection of all social ties. This is the conjuncture of psychosis, but also the one that produces exclusion. The case that concludes this book, "Dèche," demonstrates this, combining psychosis and homelessness. In such a case, there is no longer a signifier of a lack in the Other, no longer an S (A) that comes into this Other to alienate it, blocking its meaning. This strange object, whose name is engraved on the pediment of republican institutions in their motto, has the remarkable virtue of indicating that a revolution can only inscribe in reality the stones that are both the place where this object originates and what it determines. There is no revolution that is not caught up, in its upheavals, by the renewals, even if sometimes reversed, of what it wished to see disappear. However, there are disappearances that are not easily achieved: such is the case with what Lacan called the Name-of-the-Father, which, through the division it introduces, establishes the limits of our action, like the objects around which we revolve without being able to grasp them, and which are the source of all our misunderstanding and our pain. Indeed, it is they who ask, command, even demand. Freedom would thus be, in the reality of the Law, one of the aspects of the Name-of-the-Father.

In the case of psychoses, where bare owners and *usufructuaries* are the same, where the Name and the object are identical, Lacan spoke of foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. This is an absolute and irreversible register, even if it involves substitutions: for what has truly disappeared is no longer there as if it had never been, and cannot be grasped materially in a direct way. It can only be apprehended indirectly, in its effects, whether clinical or social. Being free from the Name-of-the-Father is what led Lacan to say that

1. S (A) means "that it does not respond," J. LACAN.

2. SAINTE-FARE GARNOT D., BEKOUCE F., PASMENTIER J. - "Foreclosure," in: *Le Discours psychanalytique* n° 10, Paris, March 1984.

psychotics were the only free men, which he also referred to as "normal." This type of qualification took on a formidable tone when he spoke. But the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, even if it plays out in an all-or-nothing register, remains a net with holes large enough to let many fish, big and small, slip through. A matter of "the extent of foreclosure," as we once

heard him say. Hence a clinic of psychoses, structured differentially despite what they have in common. Outside the field of psychoses, the clinic could also be treated from the angle of the modalities according to which the Name-of-the-Father is triturated. Or even in the consequences that globalization of exchanges, migratory phenomena, and changes, for economic and scientific reasons, in what constitutes common values between groups and nations, but also between father and son, men and women, have on subjects. This gives rise to multiple contradictions, often sanctioned by the ultimate determination of the law: contradiction between private law and general law, circumcision and excision understood as actual castration or even "voluntary assault and battery on minors," whereas—as a symbolic operation—it is the part abandoned to the Other that integrates the subject into his community and socializes him. However, in our climate—contrary to the principle of the unavailability of the state of the person—the Court of Cassation can agree to the change of civil status of transsexuals, responding pragmatically with "what's done is done"—in the compassionate manner of a passage-to-action specific to our ferocious societies. We could also examine the heterogeneous modes of socialization according to whether they produce, through schoolchildren, citizens who adhere to the body of texts transmitted to them, or whether they operate their transmission through the family, the terroir. What complex and conflicting modes of transmission are then mobilized in the same subject? These are poorly explored areas, whose topography psychoanalysis leaves us to establish, and which are explosive at present. We would then touch on political problems, fratricidal wars, delinquency, but also other clinical facts—poorly perceived, unmentioned—that weave together our most ordinary social life. This collection deals with these issues, but rarely in a direct way. As with a symptom, it is futile to tackle it head-on: it must be approached within the structure in which it is woven. Nevertheless, it is the common thread. We have chosen here to link together, from what we have presented in the past, what seemed to us to be an appropriate framework, although none of the following texts was written to be collected under our title. Hence our presentation. Through certain points expressly formulated by Lacan, we find considerations of social, political, and legal clinical practice which, concluding on transsexualism, evoke certain aspects of contemporary societies that present themselves without subjective residue, that is, without lack, even though they continue to produce real exclusions in the name of human rights. It indicates that the only real father is the true woman, the only complete woman, towards whom these societies tend. A few brief clinical remarks follow on the difference between acting out and passage to the act, which refer to essential categories running through everything.

This book is tied up in the "question" of the father. Lacan was able to say that the father is not a question, because he is the "subject before the question." We will then address little-known aspects of transference in psychoses, insofar as psychotics are—contrary to what is taught—those who resist transference the least. For example, this patient, hallucinatorily called by our voice, who, having become erotomaniacal, became convinced that she had to bear our name: the hallucination fell away, but the demand for marriage remained... This chapter raises the question of the hole in the Other, the one that sucks in and spits out, a unique hole—what does it suck in? What does it spit out?—where we can see the structural deficiencies of drives and fantasies at

play, exemplified by mania. In the case of erotomania that we have mentioned, our voice, as a hole, sucks it in, only to spit out its demand to bear our name. In the same vein, a brief article on an essential point: the frequent dissociation of voice and speech in psychoses, a-phonetic voices sometimes disjointed from unformulated but articulated words in the passage to act. Continuing with the theme of the sexual non-rapport, which is erased in psychoses, we will provide an illustration of this erasure that produces rapport in the chapter *A Successful Marital Bond: Unian Psychosis More Frequent Than We Think*. In psychoses, there is a relationship, but it is a relationship with the Other. In the case presented, it is divorce that, by subtracting the Name, makes it reappear in the reality of the voice. Lacan was able to say: "a woman only meets a man in psychosis."

With "the man with imposed words," whom we brought to Lacan and whom he used in *Le Sinthome*, we produce a case of psychosis that is extremely rich and unique in our experience. We will observe a patronymic transformed in an equally eminent and feminizing manner. Completing our journey, with "the Dèche" we finally examine a subject reduced to being nothing more than an object a that rolls along, taking itself for its name, a pure crystallization of the symphysis of being and existence, before whom it is we who ask questions, risking to insert meaning where there is none, except for the significantly raw power of a language entirely carried by the skeleton of a formidably ruthless grammaticality. "White" psychosis for some: but our categories allow us to dispense with this type of metaphor, in a tableau that contains none. To pad out the collection, we will recall where we spoke from: the margin of freedom that was ours, including the place of object to which we allowed ourselves to drift, of which this journey is one of the inscriptions.

### 1. In the service of the master

The psychoanalyst is justified, for various reasons, in intervening in the debate on societies sickened by their culture. For one essential reason at least: the general reference to science, whose discourse seems to be authoritative for all. Yet the foundations of science, its universality and communicability, depend essentially on the rejection of any ontological question, any questioning of the Subject. How can we fail to see the reappearance elsewhere, in strange and disguised forms, of responses to this rejection? Are there not responses elsewhere than where they are expected? This is certainly what psychoanalysis teaches, since it is this Subject eliminated from science ("foreclosed," as Jacques Lacan said) that it has to deal with when it returns in the form of complaints and symptoms. What the psychoanalyst addresses is truth as a cause—the cause of suffering—whereas science excludes it, reducing it to the opposition between true and false. If truth is contestable, it is less by default than by structure, because it always concerns a relationship with the other, which makes it impossible to say everything. Science, on the other hand, is without address. It dispenses with the other, which does not prevent it from being supported by a fantasy of universalization. By stating its formulas only by evacuating all division, it establishes a pure subject, an absolute subject. This does not prevent the drama of certain scientists, for whom truth is When A. Lichnerowicz writes, "thus

physics offers us a conception of the world,”<sup>3</sup> it is surprising that the latter does not address any of these essential questions: what is a father, filiation, enjoyment, courage and cowardice, in short, everything that makes men revolve around elusive concepts, which nevertheless make them act when they delude themselves into thinking they have some kind of control, even though they have eliminated the question of the object that causes their desires.

What is this object, which is not that of science? For we must decide on this: all social life is based on it, as if it were determined by it. The simple fact of the unconscious, that there is a discourse speaking within us without our having the slightest idea of it, is sufficient to indicate the divided nature of the Subject. Sometimes it manifests itself in slips of the tongue, witticisms, failed actions, dreams. More

3. See note 1.

often acts in the setbacks that we have prepared for ourselves without having the slightest idea of the reasons why they happen to us. This divided Subject is not an entity. Once science is accepted as the master, it becomes futile to advocate for improvements in education, information, or even training: when the transmission of knowledge conforms to premises of subjective exclusion, the outcome can only be the same. The rampant and triumphant intrusion of science is thus met with a terrible inflation of the triple field of fear, guilt, and hatred. The deployment of magic, religious wars, and segregationist phenomena of all kinds. Science has swung over to the side of the Master. It serves him. The Master has done his part: our politicians, administrators, and managers repeat *ad nauseam*, "We are only your representatives. Tell us what to do." Shying away from their responsibilities, they proliferate commissions and committees of wise men on research, education, and ethics, and organize general assemblies on social security. Ultimately, they tell us: "You are wonderful people. But you give us no immediate answers. Nothing is resolved, so we who are in the thick of things have to make up our minds." A sleight of hand where science, like other forms of knowledge and expertise that have passed into the hands of the Master, allows him—in denial, in concealment of his power—to exercise laws without ever having to account for the knowledge from which they derive. The Master currently has even less to answer for (when do we see a minister who resigns for incompetence commit suicide or go to prison?) because he has appropriated all the knowledge that has been placed at his service. Meanwhile, he is exempt from producing his own knowledge, which is not that of science. The university, too, has shifted to the service of the Master: it has produced units of value, while citizens are seized by stock market values. The truth cries out beside us. In December 1986, those students who refused to be reduced in their use value simultaneously demanded that their exchange value on the market be guaranteed—in their anxiety: book value, added value, in a "liberal" economy. Those who want their place in society demand it in the very terms that they suffer from. What we call today: "you have to know how to sell yourself" and with "a plus" (preferably capitalizable). In this nightmare and anxiety that science elides, there is no point in appealing to any kind of goodwill: most people have never wanted to know anything other than what suits them. And what suits them are determinations that they are unaware of animating their

discourse. But the truth lies elsewhere than in production, and moreover So, in this task, where will we find our direction? It is doubtful that culture will help us: Claude Jullien points out how, under Vichy, men of the same culture could either sink into barbarism (whether out of a desire to be on the winning side, or because they were captivated by the dark god who demanded segregative sacrifice, or simply to sleep peacefully) or, with courageous insight, stare the monster in the face, at the risk of their lives.

The question concerns what a person can appreciate about the objects that determine them, either to merge with them or to detach themselves from them. Thought without object? I don't think so. For thought, as Jacques Lacan argued, is more on the side of affect: that is, the way in which we suffer from the discourse that passes through us. Like all affect—especially anxiety—it is not without object, even if that object is difficult to name. Thus, in capitalist society, it will be called surplus value, to which all the degraded causes of desire are reduced. A society without a plan? Certainly not. These objects lead us most surely toward the worst inconveniences, through real and marked paths, even if we have no articulable plans. They pull us: voices, glances, appearances, various looks, media. The real as such is only the effect of the discourses that produce it, in which we are all caught up. So what action should we take? At the very least, we must distinguish between the impossible and the powerless, without which our actions are not acts but chimeras and pretenses. In any case, the modern world has certainly not become more complex: it has become brutally clear, if not blindingly so. But we are its blind people. All this is perfectly in line with the economic climate we find ourselves in: fear for survival, fierce competition, exhausting rivalries. The modern Master, being blinded, no longer even knows that he himself serves the surplus value that commands him. As for institutions, we know that they are, above all, phenomena of writing that create places and manipulate identifications. Because of this ignorance, this repression, this camouflage, institutions fall squarely into what Pierre Legendre calls *social ferocity*. The increased legalism of social relations and the appeal to the State, as well as to the Administration, thus testify to a remarkable submission to this monster, which is one of the faces of this State: social love, whose sole purpose is to ensure that subjects reproduce at the lowest possible cost in order to facilitate the circulation of the ready-made objects of consumption that they themselves have become. It is therefore indeed a war for control over the distribution of places in the exchange, and this war is not without a strange taste for control and organizational frenzy. Fury to produce the institution, labeled. In this war, as is often the case in wars, it is much less a matter of opposition to one another than of identification with one another. For we are always more or less captive to the paths and issues we have promoted ourselves, unaware that they are only a flat reiteration of social, economic, cultural, that govern us without our knowledge. Lacan said: "the unconscious is the social." This statement may have shocked many psychoanalysts. Yet the unconscious is external to us; it is the discourse of the Other, anonymous, impersonal, loud-mouthed, that governs us. Meanwhile, in the absence of collective enunciation, statements proliferate. He also said: "In neurosis, the relationship to the Other is of utmost importance. In perversion, the relationship to the phallus is of utmost importance. In psychosis, the relationship to one's own

body is of great importance. However, what we are seeing develop is precisely this: First, the relationship to the Other is becoming less and less of a problem, since all subjects are themselves becoming interchangeable objects in a generalized and unifying economic exchange. The problem is therefore becoming less and less important.

Next, the relationship with the phallus is becoming increasingly important in capturing the desire of customers, and we present ourselves as the Other whose phallic mastery can capture their desire. It is "the most" (i.e., psychoanalysis "most," I manage "most," my father is "most," etc.). As a result, perversion amplifies itself with the retroactive, circular consequence of excluding the Other. Citizens are then all the more fragmented as they are managed by a monolithic monster, without subjective division, even though this operation has actually taken place within them. A move we will call: *that of passing oneself off as the Other of the Other*. An operation of foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, that is, *Verwerfung* of castration, specific to capitalism. Centralism—once a French peculiarity—is growing in the form of supra-governmental multinationals, which are the real decision-making centers of economic, social, and cultural life. As a result, the Master (S1) is reinforced and knowledge (S2) is placed at his service. The modern Master couldn't care less about knowledge. All he cares about is that it works. The more knowledge (S2) wants to be recognized as knowledge, the more it reinforces the Master (S1). This explains the institutional, public, and political phobia of many psychoanalysts who no longer dare to speak out about their collective and civic lives. But they pay the price for this. Looking at this panorama, it becomes clear that it is the social that takes precedence over reality, to the point that the name becomes a monetary value, like the other fragments of the body. In short, what needs to be saved is the ego. But on this occasion, it is the object a that the ego serves, which means that the ego itself will not be saved: it can only be downgraded, good for the scrap heap, depending on the circumstances.

The mysteries of the state, whether psychoanalytical or not, may be unfathomable, but its heart is not. Its love is guaranteed. This type of construct could be called *state erotomania*, leading to a chain of various scenarios, including, among others, ready-made psychoanalysis, manufactured psychoanalysis, and even more so, modern psychiatry. It should be noted, for example, that in France, one of the measures taken in recent years in hospitals has been to subordinate doctors to their administrative directors, while the concept of the hospital as a business has developed. As for psychoanalysis, it is in danger of becoming "corporate psychoanalysis," with the dominant discourse being that well known in the armed forces of "accountability," "justification," "guarantee," and "assurance." This discourse, in the service of evaluation and quantification, believes in a science that it has poorly digested—because Science itself does not believe in it—while Science is put at its service.

It is clear that this game of institutional fiction, written by pseudo-science and the Administration, only provides answers to fictitious questions. Fictitious questions receive fictitious answers, while reality proliferates alongside them as the true answer, albeit an unrecognized one.

## 2. Delinquency\*

Let us allow the theme of delinquency to introduce us straight away to the issue of boundaries, those within which we operate and whose margins we must assess, since we are operating on the edge<sup>1</sup>. This term is not analytical, but it cannot leave us indifferent, since we have, whether we like it or not, to conform to norms, various circles that produce and question various functions and objects within us. Nor can it leave us indifferent when, technically, we have to establish rules that question specific functions in the Other, those required by the specific aims of psychoanalysis. This kind of evocation has often outraged our colleagues in the past. As if, with the usual shifts that confuse standardization and normalization, a psychoanalyst had nothing to judge. Our goals here are diverse. The first, fundamental one is to raise again the question of the nature of dialogue, since we know that what is said depends on who is listening. What emerges varies depending on who is listening and questioning: magistrate, theologian, or psychoanalyst, even if they ask the same questions, those of Roman law: who? how?

Why? This places what matters to us simultaneously at the social and private levels, the identity of which remains rather obscure in the history of the analytical movement, despite Freud, since this technical remark, often misread, seems to have prevailed: that a psychoanalyst must refrain from judging his patient. But Freud was talking about moral judgment, which does not exempt the psychoanalyst from judging what is valuable. We know how this assessment arises for him, since it concerns both the production of objects *a*, those objects that cause desire (breast, feces, penis...), and the way in which they intervene in human life. While the psychoanalyst does not judge the man, he does judge what drives him, that is, the way in which his fantasy, his defection, or even his absence, delivers him like a puppet to what concerns him. Lacan reminded us how the object *a*

\* Study days of the Freudian Association, "Delinquency: Psychoanalytic Questions," *Le Trimestre psychanalytique* n° 3, April 1988.

1. This refers to the topology of the subject as J. Lacan attempted to outline it in his seminars *Identification* and the *Analytic Act* (unpublished). The subject is not a hypostasis but is identical in structure to the edge of a Möbius strip, which edge is identical to its surface.

requires a revision of ethics. To foreclose this question, to render it inaccessible, would be to foreclose the very place from which a psychoanalyst proceeds and would render his entire practice inconsistent, even opening up his actions to extreme consequences: driving the other person mad or delinquent. There is no such thing as harmless psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, therefore, neither prescribes nor legislates, but that does not mean that it should dispense with its axes, means, and assessments, which allow a subject to know, if they so desire, what they are prepared to confront, or even confront themselves, even if it goes against what the law may prescribe. This is an eminently social and socialized question, insofar as each of us has to consider what we are dealing with and how we are to respond to it. We are therefore caught between responsibility and intentionality. For example, the experience of psychosis, like that of acting out, teaches us how many acts are devoid of any intentionality, automatic, linked to the

very way in which, by virtue of the structure of language, it responds, it responds anyway, and without us seeing it, both in our patients and in the world. This does not prevent us, as lawyers, theologians, or psychoanalysts, from being compelled to make our own assessments. This is an inevitable dilemma, which is part of the usual fog of human relations, especially when they are highly codified.

What is the margin of the subject's freedom? Let us say from the outset that it is nothing other than that of the *double loop*<sup>2</sup>? constituent of the subject whose notion we must grasp, like the object around which it revolves, which subjugates us; and we must occupy a third position in relation to this subjugation. We are thus faced with an aporia of psychoanalysis: we know, on the one hand, that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, and on the other hand, that if our patient is not held responsible for what he formulates and does, there is no psychoanalysis. But this is only an apparent paradox, because of the child he once was. In short, psychoanalysis refers to the responsibility of the child that he still carries within him; and without this, Freud's article on *Verneigung*, denial—the very birth of the symbol—would make no sense. And psychoanalysis as a whole would make no sense either. This means that there is no innocence in the subject, even if he were to go mad, having lost the means to know what he has rejected. And psychoanalysis as a whole. This means that there is no innocence in the subject, even if he becomes insane, having lost the means to know what he has rejected. This is a decisive point, without which there would be no psychoanalysis, no family or society, insofar as family and society are the result of repression.

2. See previous note. If you follow the edge of the Möbius strip, it forms a double loop.

In his report on *Psychoanalysis and Criminology*, Lacan notes: "there is a glaring discrepancy between the emotional references that pit the prosecution and defense attorneys against each other, because they are those of the jury, and the objective notions that the expert brings to bear, but which, lacking dialectical skills, he is unable to convey, unable as he is to hammer them home in a conclusion of irresponsibility."\*

We can say that irresponsibility is not innocence. We work between sentimental references: pathos, Goodness, universal Values, and the entirely unsentimental question of psychic causality, of its determinism, which—when properly understood—can eventually allow for what we call prognosis, and rigorous prognosis at that. This type of statement often outrages psychoanalysts: it objectifies their patients! It dares to formulate a diagnosis! Or a prognosis! They know, however, that an unsentimental, apathetic practice certainly gives the subject more of a chance than practices that manifest all the good that one wishes for oneself.

We have known many psychoanalysts who wondered how a practitioner could possibly carry out an expert assessment. In their eyes, it was scandalous to be committed to testing the rigor of our discipline and what it implies in terms of deterministic rationality. We sensed a desire to avoid testing the very foundations of our practice and our qualifications, to avoid having to pronounce on the existence of unconscious determinisms, whose mechanisms are



certainly diverse, but equally rigorous in the effects they produce. If a psychoanalyst does not pronounce on what is within his own purview, what will he pronounce on? This may shed light on the discredit into which part of the analytical movement has fallen, through the fault of the psychoanalysts themselves, for it is more difficult to defend one's own discourse than to slip into already established discourses. We are thus brought to the very heart of this problem of responsibility.

We recall that delinquency is defined in relation to a norm established by discourse, and we are often inclined, when faced with a transgression, to attribute intentionality to it, even if it is unconscious. It should be noted that it is those who assess or judge a behavior who characterize it as transgressive, whereas, very often, the person who has transgressed has no appreciation of the boundary they have crossed: there are fundamental distinctions to be made between the various transgressions that the subjects we are dealing with may commit, or even those that we ourselves are capable of committing, and this question of transgression. This is essential because it raises the question of what transgressions are and where they

3. LACAN J. — "Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology," *Écrits*, Seuil, Paris, 1966, p. 139.

proceed to the limits—whether we call them inhibitions, impossibilities, or something else—of an individual's actions. We also know that these transgressions, or possible violations, often amount to complaints about a norm from which the subject feels excluded, which seems to him to come down to "don't abandon me" at the very moment when they continue to engage in the most repeated acts of aggression: a complaint of irreparable harm that the Other will not appease. We are familiar with the great unease of "psychologists" and magistrates alike when faced with these cases that oscillate between prison and hospitals: should they be punished or treated? We know that it concerns the various spheres in which we are all caught up, and which question various functions within us. These subjects have at least one more essential fact in common: they fall between walls and are managed legally and institutionally. They show that in the absence of assumed supervision, the latter returns to them in the form of the hospital or prison. The fundamental meaning of the phenomenon is always the same: those who choose the symbolic, the forbidden, see the reality of the social system that organizes and administers them at greater or lesser expense so that they do not cause too much disturbance, except for those whose profession requires them to know about it (who, if they are not too obtuse, are divided on the issue).

Delinquency is therefore a topical issue: the daily press bears witness to this. Everyone talks about its rise, its dangers, and this is not pure fantasy. Delinquency grows as the Name-of-the-Father declines, that symbolic Name which represents and asserts that there are prohibitions. It should be noted, however, that what is examined in the comments reported in the newspapers is not what might be responsible for this decline of the Name-of-the-Father, but how a moral order might be restored: even as a moral order becomes ever more insistent, more demanded, in circumstances where what constitutes a subject becomes more problematic. In short, iron orders

are forged only to the extent that the Name-of-the-Father, insofar as it links desire to the Law, is increasingly eroded, rejected, questioned, or suspended in times when desire and need are collapsed, to be presented as subjective constraints. Advertising operates in much the same way. Moral order refers to customs, that is, to what is shared. This has nothing to do with ethics. Ethics is non-consensual. It concerns what, for each individual and on a case-by-case basis, constitutes value. In this regard, Advocate General Baechlin was very clear in the Abdallah case. He acknowledged that the law was no longer valid. What is valid—as the press reported—are arrangements between heterogeneous symbolic constructs. The disadvantage is that there are no arrangements between heterogeneous symbolic constructs. They are forced. Baechlin pointed out that the difficulty in defining delinquency, even criminal delinquency, stems from the fact that it proves impossible to classify according to need. It is an enigmatic and fascinating question for everyone, one that concerns naming and classification, and which returns in an increased demand to name and classify.

The classic question constantly arises: what contribution does psychoanalysis make to psychiatry, as well as to law? This is a delicate question because we know that two heterogeneous points of view cannot be combined: they are mutually exclusive in the particular mode of forced choice, with the consequent loss, even if one of the points of view considers that it encompasses the other. And, in this case, it merely indicates its fantasy of totalization, but it seems that this is what our world is dealing with. Indeed, we are witnessing the proliferation of looks, the preeminence of images to be presented so that the other is captivated by them. We forget only that by becoming One with the similar through images, we create an agonizing and intolerable completeness that aims to provoke these sects. Brutal cuts and violent enucleations abound in the world, indicating a world where practical degradation reveals mechanisms that establish universal and malicious, infantile meaning as compensation for incapacity. The fantasies of grandeur that are their counterpart can do nothing about it. They are only imaginary substitutes for symbolic deficiencies, while reality wreaks havoc, either in the form of proliferating acting-outs<sup>4</sup> or in the unsymbolizable form of suicidal acting-outs: dishonorable wars and blind attacks, shameful negotiations and concern not to shock public opinion, as if not to compromise "the standard of living."

This is a phrase that must be listened to carefully, because the true "standard" has only a symbolic low point, the drama coming from the fact that it is reduced to being purely commercial, that is to say, crazy, disordered, uncontrollable. Simultaneously with what appears to be fragmentation, refusal to accept scarcity, concerns about muzzling, dismissing, and destroying, and the growth of segregationist phenomena, we see an accentuation of indicators such as fantasies of unity and totalization. However, we know that it is not the object that gives meaning to the obsession, but rather the obsession that gives meaning to the object. This gives rise to dangers far greater than those we seek to mitigate, in the form of widespread social delinquency, whether recognized and punished, or neither recognized nor punished, as the

subjectivity of the time becomes increasingly obsessed with serving goods or a master. Which is the same thing.

So, it is no surprise that words and actions are at odds. What is happening is an attempt to justify what is emerging between, on the one hand, a morality whose recognized obsolescence cannot be analyzed but remains influential, and on the other hand, actions that are increasingly subject to the service of goods, leading to a specific and simple morality: one that dictates that there should be no trust or credibility in others, since others do not present themselves as potential deceivers, but as deceivers by market discipline. Namely, in a proven relationship that can be summed up as: *two can play at that game*. So why should we be surprised at the increase in crime, widespread crime, even at the international level, while the crimes that are punished only concern small fry, waste in short?

4. Acting-out refers to unconscious phallic displays that can never be interpreted directly: otherwise, they proliferate.

At the beginning of the seminar *La psychanalyse à l'envers*<sup>5</sup>, Lacan stated that "all villainy is based on being someone else's Other, where the figures that capture one's desire take shape." Elsewhere, he had formulated: "the unconscious is the social." In certain psychoanalytic circles, even Lacanian ones, this statement caused a scandal. However, if the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, there is nothing shocking about such a statement. It is through this statement that we can identify the false divide between private and public laws, for it is from this statement that all questions concerning the social bond proceed.

In Milan in 1972, in a lecture on psychoanalytic discourse, Lacan once proposed a "capitalist discourse," which had the property of being without limits, that is, without the Real and without the impossible. It is therefore not surprising that this Real returns in the form of rejects, delinquents, who themselves become a limit as they accumulate, rejects oscillating between protest and violence, without their knowledge. This applies to all men: those who are excluded from the symbolic find themselves propelled into the Real, and the Real that comes out of their mouths speaks the language of nightmares. But it is a nightmare that rarely wakes us up.

Rather, it takes on the aspect of the "dream within a dream" that Freud evoked. Just as the dream within a dream represents internal exclusion and concerns the Real, this refuse is subject to legal and institutional management. We see that the refuse is framed, put in parentheses, and these parentheses are the real walls of the prison. It is worth noting that the psychoanalyst is not without something in common with the other refuse. Like them, he is a dupe among the non-dupes; like them, he must be managed, framed, eliminated. Lacan spoke of him as the waste and refuse of jouissance. Like them, the psychoanalyst is that dream within a dream, an index of the Real that we want nothing to do with; like them, he is the one who pays for those who do not pay. In short, we find ourselves in an interesting situation where the one who is truly in the Name-of-the-Father, that is, in the laws of speech, is not far from suffering the same treatment as the one who is suffering and the effect of his degradation. Those who do not fail in terms of ethics would be treated exactly like those who are the product of a morality of service to goods.

We would then understand why a whole section of the psychoanalytic movement prefers to be on the side of power and participate with the non-duped managers, rather than appear to be the abnormal figure that is the psychoanalyst. We would then understand why we also encounter a psychiatry that is non-judgmental and too often concerned primarily with administration in the name of "public service," as well as a psychoanalysis that advertises itself on Minitel.

5. LACAN J. — *La Psychanalyse à l'envers*, Book VII (1969-1970), Lecture of January 21, 1970. Champ freudien collection, Seuil, Paris, 1991.

We can sense how this contributes to a hatred of symbolism and the laws of speech, as well as a hatred of desire transformed into erotology. We can appreciate the consequences: a proliferation of bogus sciences and disciplines, these fake sciences where psychologists of all stripes compensate for the loss of their authentic functions, failing to appreciate science, theology, and law as local cases of the logic of fantasy to which only psychoanalysis gives its true status.

### 3. Current events and limits of contemporary paranoia\*

Of all forms of madness, this is undoubtedly the most human, perhaps the purest, and even the best understood. Did Lacan not begin his work with a study of paranoia (1932), then reveal the paranoid nature of all human knowledge linked to the structure of the ego (1936), borrowed from Freud the term *Verwerfung*, which under the name of foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father can hardly be disputed as being at work in psychosis (1955), and finally, towards the end of his teaching, asserted that paranoid psychosis and personality were one and the same (1975): the continuity of the three registers of subjectivity: Real, Symbolic, Imaginary.

A paradox is highlighted here. "Paranoia" refers to the purest form of psychosis, but also to the most universal structure of the self, while a clinical observation must be made: diagnosis is not always easy, especially in women and immigrants. Authentic paranoid symptoms develop in the absence of psychosis, which can be verified retrospectively. This is even the almost inevitable response of any subject who, for some contingent reason, is deprived of the resources of their fantasy, when the ever-possible autonomy of the self is revealed in the person of the persecutor. The greater frequency of these reactions today, if proven, seems to be part of a paranoid reality. We will see the symptoms of this—on the one hand, in the proliferation of legislative and regulatory texts, etc., a sign of the failure of a symbolic law that ensures, as best it can, a peaceful relationship between the subject of castration and his fellow man—on the other hand, in the rise of nationalism, sectarianism, and other forms of segregation that cause citizens, uncertain of the foundations of their legitimacy, to cling to the affirmation of an identity. Logic shows that the latter can only be asserted through exclusion. Two major phenomena can be correlated with these symptoms.

Firstly, the universalization of exchanges (including human beings) according to the real laws of the market and no longer those of particular symbolic systems. Systems that are only valid within the limits of the group of those they

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subjugate. "Sell yourself!" is the new transcultural slogan, to which a rude "sold!" can be added. In this so-called capitalist discourse, which is not based on any castration, each subject can experience what they are reduced to, outside the field where their debt is valid. Considering themselves excluded from phallic enjoyment or aggrieved in its distribution, they will experience it as "xenopathic." Finally, the spread of a discourse that values science, readily disguised under the guise of a new secular ethic, leads us to hope in the virtues of an ideal, unequivocal language that would remove misunderstanding and rid our imperfect languages of the obscure object that infects them due to phallic significance. Hope in a science whose passion for explanation would finally overcome contingency. Is this not already a call for widespread paranoia? Global psychiatry, in its efforts to create such a common language, has already produced an atheoretical, consensual masterpiece (the various DSMs), which legislates on the Real in a completely democratic manner but which, curiously, lacks a definition of the word "delusion." This work, which is well suited to the market economy of psychotropic drugs, is itself a commercial success. But the relevance of paranoia must also be produced. First, by taking up the questions where they were abandoned on the grounds of dogmas to be challenged. Yet we know that the organicist positions of a Clérambault in no way invalidated the relevance of his analyses. By tracing the emergence of the concept, we can verify this paradox: it was among constitutionalists, under the name of "personal meaning" (Neisser, 1892), that the emphasis in identifying delirium shifted from reference to reality to a singular subjective position. Specifying the extent of paranoia in the field of psychoses and, outside their field, in those paranoid episodes that may well be nothing more than an inverted praise of phallic normality, account for the contrasting opposition that can be observed in the course of psychosis, depending on whether passion (with its immutable, immediately fixed character) or the interpretation of an enigmatic experience (with the long-term work of delusion) prevails, to re-situate sensitive paranoia on the basis of its ethical sensitivity, to approach a possible and elusive linguistic specificity of paranoid statements, to revisit the articulation between hypochondria and paranoia, to understand the determinants of paranoia in a child deprived of childhood and to approach them from the perspective of structure rather than transgenerational causality, questioning the mechanism of foreclosure in its relationship to love and in what will return to it, making room for the contribution of knot topology in that it allows for a renewal of the presentation of paranoia, the possibility of writing new forms of psychosis, but also the minimal supports of subjectivity as supposition, such are the main axes of our cause.

In a previous study, we attempted to address the question of transference in psychoses, highlighting, contrary to Freud's teaching that there is no transference in psychoses and that psychotics are particularly resistant to it, that the latter demonstrate in their relationship to the Other that they are not very resistant to transference. In this regard, a young manic patient demonstrated this clearly. We hardly had to say a word; she reacted to our slightest frown, facial expression, or gesture, in a direct and perfectly tense relationship with us.

She was controlled with a flick of the finger. What were we doing there? If not to participate ourselves in this "big mouth" that kept sucking her in. This puts into perspective everything we have read about the "analysis" of subjects in a state of manic access. This unbridled frenzy is exemplary of the place of the Other in psychosis: exclusion, and at the same time, occupying the entire field. This is if we are willing to consider that the different psychoses we may encounter highlight, each in their own way, one of the aspects—possibly exemplified—of the general structure of psychoses. However, this young woman emphasized what we have often insisted on concerning mania, namely "decapitation." She emphasized the undifferentiated nature of the orality that sucked her in, to the point that everything took on this aspect of "big mouth" for her: whether it was the ear, the gaze, the voice, the image, or even the color of our tie. This was true for everyone present, as she was drawn in by a kind of sliding, infinite metonymy, into this or that aspect they presented. She thus clearly showed that she had absolutely no resistance to the Other, based on an extreme but obvious case. What this young woman demonstrated concerns the very field of transference in psychosis. A truly totalitarian dimension of her relationship to the Other; that is to say, a type of relationship in which the very question of the subject is completely vaporized; reducing herself to a wandering, contingent, indifferent object, equivalent to any object, capable of lending itself to filling whatever comes before her—sucking it in to reform the very type of completeness that feeds everything.

The paranoid rebels against this situation. Saying no, he follows the law of his heart. Lacan was able to formulate that paranoia was what he was trying to make into a symptom. He says no to contingency in the Other by introducing it. I completely agree with this formulation, but with a few nuances. For what the psychoanalyst would have to back down from in no case. We would, of course, be *Parama* if psychoanalysts had to teach psychotics, but how can they do so if they do not follow them? To learn something, you have to get down to it. Freud said, "When you can't cure people, you have to be content with learning something and earning a living." Informed listening can be extremely useful for a psychotic. But it is important to know that this listening has consequences. Lacan's remarks led many people to say, "I analyze psychotics." We would not claim that there are no people among us who are sufficiently knowledgeable about the issues raised by psychosis to be unable to carry out appropriate analytical work. But we also do not hesitate to say that this cannot, under any circumstances, be a banner, in the very sense that psychotics do not resist transference, which has immediate consequences. If analysis is an excellent means of triggering neurosis, it is even more so for psychosis. At the very least, we should know that when we ourselves trigger, through our actions, through the fact that we are included in the picture, a response and a rearticulation of the world that is fundamentally totalitarian, we simultaneously place ourselves in the position of having to respond to what we ourselves have triggered. Is the response articulated in our division? Or in a compact mode? We know how psychoanalysts respond to a patient who triggers a well-constructed, articulated, focused, and persecutory paranoia: they do what everyone else does.

They hospitalize them or call the police. Thus, practitioners are demonstrating that, more often than not, a totalitarian enterprise can only be countered in a totalitarian manner, without division, even if sometimes it is armored divisions that are called into action. We mention these facts because they should teach us something about segregation, about the fact that heterogeneous logics are not compatible. This also applies to neuroses: there is no synthesis. It is the synthesis that does not exist. We are always in a state of non-relationship with the consequences that follow. You try to make two types of heterogeneous logics coexist in the same person, but they prove to be incompatible, and the response that occurs is a response in the Real, whatever forms these responses may take in the Real: anxiety, acting out, possibly messianic or millenarian, somatic phenomena, hallucinations. The catalog is limited, but "It" responds anyway. Since we are usually subject, without our knowledge, to heterogeneous symbolic orders, we may wonder to what extent we do not respond to them in ways that go completely unnoticed. And why would we see them, since we have pressed one register and it responds in another? You press the Symbolic and it responds, for example, in the Imaginary or in the Real. Or it creates a *sinthome* so that the knot does not come undone. We mentioned this totalitarian fact, like the facts of segregation that we should learn from psychotics: thus this type of incarceration, in the case of hypochondria, of the object that gnaws at the subject's body without him being able to separate himself from it, which he may seek to remove through radical, even surgical, maneuvers. There is no shortage of such cases on a national scale.

Where are we now? In a state of soft totalitarianism. It's an interesting situation. On the one hand, we have the critical success of neuroscience, which is completely at odds with clinical practice, i.e., what patients say (no doubt to prevent what they tell us from dividing us). On the other hand, we have the biopsychosocial management of mental illness and the administrative management of those who are firmly required to implement it. As for the authentic function of the practitioner, a sacred and traditional function based on transference, it has been pushed out of the picture. It turns out that the psychiatric profession has abdicated what was once its concern: reflection on its authentic function, that is, on the reality at stake in the phenomena presented to it, for its patients, currently referred to as "sector" management or "service project."

We no longer talk about "admitting," but rather "discharging." Having failed to formulate their own discipline, it is the administration that dictates it to them. The same goes for their function, as in the army and all other established bodies, and the way in which they must account for it. But how can they account for it in a so-called "liberal" economy? In an accounting manner. Thus, in their panic, linked to the impossibility of sustaining their own discourse, they have come, as Lacan mentioned in the *Écrits*, to abandon their own discourse in favor of those already established. If psychosis indeed confronts us with the totalitarian radicality of the relationship to the Other when it is direct and without mediation, then, in the name of humanism, of compassion for everyone, a society is organized where social relations are no longer regulated or arranged by the type of pact that would establish the relationship between individuals, as it presupposes trust (precisely because the Other may deceive), but rather by the opposite: it is no longer a pact but a

contract. The "social contract," replacing the symbolic pact and functioning as Reality, gives society its prevalence as Reality. It is unheard of to read in the writings of certain jurists that there is a demand for "more law." What law are they referring to? In the meantime, statutes, codes, and procedures are obviously being created: which is precisely the demonstration of the pact's deficiency.

The more rules and laws there are, the more opportunities there are to be at fault, to be delinquent. As for practitioners, they are not asked to account for the foundations of their discipline and their qualifications, but rather to remain silent about the foundations of the social system in which they are enrolled and which they help to manage. In other words, psychologists of all stripes are asked to participate in the repression, even the foreclosure, of what their discipline reveals to them, when it is this revelation that they should be promoting: the first of our institutions is transference, while in public life the first institutional duty is to relieve subjects of their desire so that they reproduce at the lowest possible cost: such is soft totalitarianism. Thus, only the social contract remains, due to the absence of any pact. And the law is no longer fundamental because it has been replaced by the contract. With the resulting effects of social psychosis. Faced with this perversion by the text, we find ourselves psychotic: that is to say, less divided than fragmented, insofar as the text itself knows no division. Such a social rule can only give rise to feelings of lawlessness, exclusion, pulverization, and atomization that bring us closer to psychosis, and all the more interpretive as we are actually and increasingly interpreted. As for the subject, it is dismissed on the basis of its very division, and crepuscular to boot. The pact has been replaced by a regulation made up of imperatives. We mentioned certain jurists who argued that there was a demand for more law. But we know that law is a loaded weapon, which first and foremost protects property, and in an economy with no limits or references other than that property itself. The economy is just as headless and anonymous as modern law. In short, the business of social life is less about respecting the subject than about creating respectability for the text. The subject has nothing to do with it: it is the most contingent object.

As for the contemporary idea of an international order, of international law that would apply to everyone, it is even more absurd. Perhaps an international law that would organize identical enjoyment for all? Whereas we know that this law is that of the best armed, by science and capital, who themselves cry injustice when they reap what they have sown. In short, it is force that, as always, creates the law and would produce a globally identical justice. There is another kind of text, of course: those that organize subjectivities and internal relations within communities. But we now know that these texts are obsolete, in contradiction with general law, that the subjects of these texts are all *Marranos* who pretend and who are ignorant of themselves.

Paranoia seeks to create unity among citizens. As for psychoanalysis, it teaches us that what constitutes our subjectivity is the relationship that does not exist, whether between men and women, between subjects, or between communities. However, the law, the armed wing of society, seeks to establish a relationship, failing to integrate the non-relationship into its very logic. The psychoanalyst knows that it is only in psychoses that there is a relationship. Between



anxiety and fear, which to choose? Those who choose fear will have anxiety as a bonus. Those who choose anxiety may lose their fear. This brings us back to the love of the text: an analyst allows himself only from himself, from a few others, and certainly not from a contractual Text. Yet our lives are increasingly regulated by Texts that are deaf to speech, contracts rather than pacts. How can we operate between the acephaly of the DSM and that of the law? That is our challenge. We have mentioned the shifts to which we are exposed, sucked in, by virtue of the very functions that are expected of us and in which we may eventually become caught up: this concerns the very question of transference, insofar as it applies—not only to our patients—but also to what is expected of us by social bodies, ministries, and administrations. This raises the question of how far our training should go. In short, what we are talking about is this: we are prey, along with our patients, to a forced transference, a transference forcing that raises the question for each of us of how far we can still resist it. Transference forcing of the anonymized text, that is, without the Name-of-the-Father, onto us, and forced transference of ourselves onto the text. We can therefore congratulate ourselves that there are still people among us who resist this. Whether they are our colleagues or anyone else.

We may then wonder what place our patients can have in this. Some are certainly resisters. There is no reason to blame them. The news is paranoid, that is to say, the world is becoming seamless, everything must be planned for. This is due as much to its expansion as to the underlying social phenomena that are driving it. On the one hand, there is the disintegration of the symbolic modalities that ensured transmission and generation in human groups, globalization without limits on trade and migration. On the other hand—and the two go hand in hand—there is the rise of science, which conveys the demand and certainty that it frees us from all contingency, when in fact, by rejecting the subject, it makes it the most contingent of objects. In short: the decapitation we mentioned earlier. Thus we see the rise of segregationist phenomena, jealous and demanding tensions, and religious wars, while no God comes to answer the erotomaniacal call of the elect who—in an unmediated appeal to the Other—can only experience the disappointment of their hopes, like their exalted imaginary compensations. At the same time, accentuated generational divides throw fathers and sons into radically alien positions to each other, putting them in a position where they only allow themselves one discourse (science as a common good is part of this), going so far as to invalidate and bypass governments: it is the Goods that govern, through the promise of Other enjoyment, while those in charge know themselves to be driven by determinations over which they have no control.

Summoned to respond to tensions, they succeed only in the form of unifying and unitary ideologies, imposing a proliferation of regulations, control procedures, and "common" legislation. Where, for the modern subject, the conditions for a peaceful existence among his own kind are unraveling, the Law of the code proliferates as a constantly augmented prosthesis for symbolic deficiency. All that is provided is a quantitative response in the impossible mode of equally distributed enjoyment, while sexuality, like sexuation—ordered phallically—is seriously undermined. As for the hollowed-out place of truth, it is filled with a reality whose form as a

consumer good takes the place of the blind and anonymous Master of Everything, whose tyranny is uninterrupted by any obstacle. The bodies of men are no exception, each part of which, now dismemberable, transplantable, even fertilizable, offers them up to a monetizable capture, and each man must—legally—hold the discourse assigned to him by his place in the administration of goods. Thus, statements are conveyed without enunciation, collapsing the place of the Other into that of the code (now civil and criminal), imposing on everyone a collective castration that does not exist, while—in a projective Reality—effective oppositions and conflicts proliferate in response to the One. The megalomaniacal jubilation that makes each person a citizen of a world that revolves around them is matched by the same citizen's micromaniacal collapse, whereby they testify that, in this world, they are nothing, with the concomitant narcissistic aggression. As for guilt and debt, which have become unpayable, they are referred to the Other incarnate, the closest neighbor, from whom I am no longer separated by any continent or sea, while they are evaded for ourselves as irreparable damage we have suffered: without author and without object, they give way to fear, hatred, and trembling. So, in the absence of castration, the object, not fallen, incarcerated in language, is rendered unfit for exchange. In the absence of a meaningful cut, linked to the Name-of-the-Father, it is the capital decapitation that prevails: just as everyone is required to produce that surplus that puts their discourse in suspense, they can only do so in the name of a fiction that recreates in the Real the lack in the Symbolic that it was supposed to fill. If the actuality we recall is correct, it is an actuality without spatial, temporal, or bodily limits. It is the hypochondriacal actuality of the object that gnaws away—current neurosis—at those who cannot separate themselves from it and seek in the other the blow—this one real—that cannot bring relief from an intolerable completeness. The news of a universal subject who, in his planetary hypochondria, tends toward fission, possibly nuclear.